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ABSTRACT
An extensive literature examines how distributive (i.e., “pork barrel”) spending is allocated
among congressional districts. Much of this research finds evidence that intra-chamber factors
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of distributive spending. However, we know much less about how extra-chamber factors such as
district-level demand and the economy impact the distribution of federal outlays. In this study, I
find that district-level demand and variation in economic factors, in particular, income and
unemployment, significantly predict the distribution of new bureaucratic awards in the 110th
Congress. The results support the contention that districts get what they need, and this raises
questions about the ability of members of powerful committees to steer awards selectively to
their districts. It also provides evidence for the economic “law of increasing state activity,” by
which districts with higher income levels receive a larger share of federal assistance.
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1
Introduction
An extensive and distinguished literature on federal spending tends to examine its
distribution based on the pork barrel thesis that powerful members of Congress are able to steer
funds to their districts based on their positions on powerful committees, seniority, or other
positions of authority. In recent years, however, some scholars have begun to examine the ways
in which district-level characteristics that are theoretically linked to specific types of agency
spending might better explain federal spending patterns. Studies that, for example, include
examinations of the impact of hazard levels on EPA superfund spending (Hird 1981), the
concentration of farms on agricultural distribution (Gryzki 1991), the impact of flood damage on
Corps of Engineers activity (Lazarus 2009), and the allocational characteristics of funds (Lee
2003) have cast some doubt on the overall strength of the traditional pork barrel thesis.
This study advances the idea that district-level characteristics, like member-specific traits,
can also be effective predictors of federal spending. It does so by examining a dataset of new
federal awards from the 110th Congress and measures their variation against district level
variables developed by Adler (2002). In the case of federal awards distributed through the
various federal agencies and bureaucratic divisions, it is reasonable to imagine that constituents
should get what constituents need. Stein (1981, 341) argued that “rather than relying exclusively
on a supply-side approach, policy makers might consider the recipients’ perspective.” The
overreliance on intra-chamber factors has led others to argue that “discretionary grant programs
are perhaps unlikely places to find strong supply side effects since these awards are made in the
byways of bureaucracies, insulated to some degree from congressional and presidential political
pressures” (Lowry and Potoski 2004, 517).
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In an attempt to move beyond any narrow focus of political determinants, I attempt to
situate economic factors more squarely within the literature on distributive spending. Past studies
have typically treated district-level economic factors like income and unemployment as control
variables. Yet Wagner’s Law, an economic theory of “increasing state activity,” provides some
guidance for why income and federal spending may be directly related. Moreover,
macroeconomic theory offers predictions about the relationship between unemployment and
federal spending.
This paper is structured as follows: I begin with a brief review of the federal budget
process and the broad role Congress is thought to have in it. Second, I review the established
literature on intra-chamber factors that have been found to influence the distribution of federal
funds. Third, I review the literature that forms the backbone of my first hypothesis: that measures
of local demand play a major role in the distribution of federal funds. Fourth, I review the
empirical work around Wagner’s Law and apply its logic to spending within Congressional
districts. Fifth, I derive hypotheses based on the scholarly literature reviewed in sections three
and four. Sixth, I introduce my original dataset of new federal assistance from the 110th
Congress, specify variables and describe empirical tests. Seventh, I present my results in the
aggregate model and across 23 separate federal agencies and bureaucratic divisions. Finally, I
discuss the results and their implications for the study of distributive politics.

I. The Federal Budget
At $3.6 trillion, the Unites States boasts the largest level of federal expenditure in the
world. In fact, U.S. federal expenditure for the fiscal year 2009 was greater than the combined
spending of the world’s second and third biggest spenders, Japan and Germany (The World
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Factbook 2010). The president has significant amount of power to set the federal spending
agenda by revealing his budgetary priorities, and Congress has the power to review this budget
and, through committee action, authorize programs and appropriate funds for bureaucratic
divisions and federal agencies subsequently to spend (Oleszek 2007, 41). Article 1, Section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the power to spend federal funds, and the 16th
amendment to the Constitution created a federal income tax so that federal programs would be
sufficiently funded (Kernell and Jacobson 2007, 13 and 190).
The vast majority of the federal budget — about 70 percent — is reserved for so-called
“non-discretionary” expenditures: interest on debt, entitlements (social security, Medicare,
pensions), and defense contracts. These funds are automatically distributed to the federal
agencies responsible for spending them. The remaining 30 percent is considered “discretionary
spending” and is allocated among the dozen or so annual appropriations bills. The first step is for
Congress to create, continue, or alter programs through the authorization process. The second
step is the appropriations phase, during which federal funds are distributed to the bureaucratic
divisions and federal agencies responsible for their expenditure. Both stages take place within
respective committees and subcommittees that maintain jurisdiction over each federal agency’s
policy area (Oleszek 2007, 40-47; Davidson and Oleszek 2000, 365-370).
The U.S. Constitution provides a limited starting point for predicting Congressional
power over the distribution of federal funds. The so-called “tax and spend clause” grants
Congress the power to provide “for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States.” Founders of the republic James Madison and Alexander Hamilton had their own
disagreements over how to interpret the phrase, the former treating it narrowly and the latter
more broadly. Madison, in Federalist 41, argued that the clause by no means granted Congress

4
autocratic spending powers and that any interpretation of the broad phrase must be contingent on
particular enumerated powers that would precede it. He defended one particular presidential veto
of transportation and waterway spending through a strict reading of “general welfare,” claiming
that such projects provide no “advantage to the general prosperity.” Hamilton, on the other hand,
sought broader Congressional spending powers, arguing that “whatever concerns the general
interests of learning, of agriculture, of manufactures, and of commerce are within the sphere of
the national Councils as far as regards an application of money.”
Two centuries after these two political leaders publically hashed out their interpretations
of such a critical constitutional clause, a large and distinguished scholarly literature has
contributed substantially to our theoretical and empirical understanding of “who gets what, how
much, and under what conditions” (Bickers and Stein 1990, 3). The “who” in this study refers to
the 435 members of the House of Representatives who seek to secure funds for their districts.
The “how much” refers to the numbers of awards and their associated value. And the
“conditions” are the variations in the political, economic, and demand-side variables that
researchers have identified as critical to the study of distributive spending patterns.

II. Supply-Side Theory and Evidence
The vast majority of scholarship seeking to explain the distribution of federal funds —
whether earmarks, grants, awards, or other forms of spending — analyzes factors intrinsic to
Congress. These “supply side” factors include electoral circumstances, committee membership,
seniority and ideology. The role of distributive policy in the relationship between voters and
politicians seeking reelection has been a topic of widespread study. Distributive policy,
according to Lowi (1964), describes those efforts “characterized by the ease with which they can
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be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit … patronage can be taken as a synonym for
distributive in the fullest meaning of the word” (Frisch 1998, 13, n. 4). This particular definition
suggests that members of Congress hope to buy loyalty — or votes — through the delivery of
benefits to their districts. This idea is consistent with the seminal body of scholarship steeped in
the rational choice tradition. Scholars like Anthony Downs (1957) and Mancur Olson (1965),
borrowing from economics, applied rational choice theories to the behaviors of parties and
interest groups (Arnold 2004). Others, notably Fiorina and Meyhew, applied rational choice
theory to legislative behavior. In his classic work on Congress, Fiorina (1977; 1989, 101-107;
Frisch 1998, 12) describes member motivations:
This approach views individuals as the fundamental actors in politics and seeks to explain
political processes and outcomes as consequences of their purposive behavior. Political
actors are assumed to have goals and to pursue those goals sensibly and efficiently.…
individuals have goals appropriate to the institutional positions around which their
careers are centered. Congressmen are assumed to have a predominant reelection motive.
One of the most oft-cited quotes in any political science literature buttresses this remark, that
“United States Congressmen [are] single-minded seekers of reelection… establish[ing] an
accountability relationship with an electorate” (Meyhew 1974, 6-7). More recent research finds
more direct evidence that members use the promise of federal funds as insurance for reelection.
Vulnerable members of Congress attempt to acquire more for their districts (Frisch 1998; Lee
2003; Stein and Bickers 1994), Democrats benefit electorally more so than Republicans (Alvarez
and Savings 1997), and incumbents can fend off challengers based on their history of delivering
to their districts (Bickers and Stein 1996).
Another way in which members seek to use the distribution of benefits is through the
formation of coalitions during the passage of large general interest omnibus bills. So-called
“minimum winning coalitions” (“MWC”) are those in which any member belonging to the
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majority-plus-one-vote side comes out a winner (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Riker 1962; Riker
and Ordeshook 1973; Snyder 1991). Yet since such a majority is marginal, it is unstable. In the
extreme case, all that is required is for a single member to move from one coalition to the other,
and the prior winning coalition becomes the losing one during the budget cycle. Ferejohn (1974)
argued that in addition to minimum winning coalitions being unstable, they cannot account for
the distribution of veto-wielding members or for the agenda-setting power of committees.
The theory of the MWC contrasts with that of the universalistic coalition, in which every
member gets at least some benefit he can deliver to his district (Barry 1965; Ferejohn 1974;
Mayhew 1974, 88-89; Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981). The financial nature of pork
as an incentive with narrowly targeted benefits and widely distributed costs suggests an
arrangement that members of Congress and constituents alike might find disagreeable. Yet
despite that, as a former Appropriations staff director remarked, “an earmark is something that
flows into 434 congressional districts and not yours. When it comes into your district, it’s a
federal investment in jobs and education” (Cohn 2006). Thus, universalistic coalition building
theory reduces the uncertainty of receiving benefits posed by the minimum winning coalition
approach and increases the likelihood that everyone will get at least something (Evans 2004,
11-12).
Members who sit on standing jurisdictional committees are thought to receive more
benefits for their districts. Distributive theory predicts that so-called “preference outliers” select
themselves onto committees of interest — in particular, those aligned with the primary concerns
of their district — and use their post to acquire even larger distributive benefits (Weingast and
Marshall 1998; Shepsle 1978; Frisch 1998).
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Partisan theories (Cox and McCubbins 1993 and 1995; Rohde 1989 and 1991) would
predict that rather than members self-selecting onto committees of interest, parties choose
committee members from their ranks. Moreover, majority party leaders have been shown to
influence the placement of specific members on influential committees. As noted above,
members of the majority party have been found to acquire a larger share of benefits for their
district than those in the minority party. (Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Balla, Lawrence,
Maltzman and Sigelman 2002; Lazarus 2009 and 2010). On the other hand, legislators may
actually refuse pork-barrel projects when voters are strongly attached to their parties (Keefer and
Khemani 2009).
A series of studies has found evidence that members of powerful jurisdictional
committees can exercise control over certain spending within relevant policy areas. (Weingast
and Marshall 1988; Lee 2003; Cohen, Coval and Malloy 2009; Frisch and Kelly 2007; Lee 2003;
De Figuerido and Silverman 2006; Lazarus 2008; Masters 1961; Law and Tonon 2006).
Authorizing committees are charged with approving new and continuing programs, while
appropriations committees determine federal funding levels across bureaucratic divisions and
federal agencies. Oleszek (2007, 46-7) summarizes their roles as follows:
Whether agencies receive the budget authority they request depends in part on the
recommendations of the authorizing and appropriating committees.… The authorizing
committees are the policy-making centers on Capitol Hill … and advocate what they
believe to be the necessary level of appropriations for new and existing federal agencies,
activities, and programs, specifying either a specific amount of money or an indefinite
level of funding… Each house’s Appropriations committee and their twelve parallel
subcommittees recommend how much federal agencies and programs will receive in
relation to available fiscal resources and economic conditions. The Appropriations
subcommittee chairs are collectively known in their respective chambers as the ‘College
of Cardinals’ because of their large influence over spending issues.
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Yet despite the numerous studies supporting the claim that standing committee members
are able to steer funds to their districts, Adler (2002, 79) argues that the jury is still out: “Years
of scholarly work have failed to conclusively establish such a relationship.” Perhaps the evidence
is mixed because so, too, are the roles that standing committees play. Oleszek (2007, 52) argues
that “authorizing committees generally support high levels of spending for the programs they
recommend and seek ways to bypass Appropriations Committee domination… [while]
appropriating panels often view themselves as guardians of the purse.” Legal scholar Fisher
(1979, 53) suggests that that “authorization committees have considerable power to force the
hand of the Appropriations Committees and, in some cases, even to appropriate.”
The strong theoretical and empirical focus on supply-side factors has provided us with a
rich understanding of “who gets what, how much, and under what conditions.” Yet for the most
part, researchers have paid less attention to the roles of district level demand and economic
factors. Indeed, one congressional analyst recently remarked, “Congress does not directly control
the level of federal spending that will occur in a particular year” (Oleszek 2007, 45). An
emerging scholarship has addressed this hole in the literature by testing the impact of carefully
designed variables that are directly relevant to specific forms of agency spending.

III. Demand-Side Theory and Evidence
In the halls of Congress or on the campaign trail, it’s not uncommon to hear members
defend the projects they help steer to their districts. California Democratic Congressman Mike
Thompson, in defending a military technology project his district received, issued a statement to
the press, remarking “when I support funding for a local project, it's 100 percent based on the
benefits it will bring to our district and nothing else” (Payne 2008). The charge from the press
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was that Thompson was trading projects for campaign contributions. He was forced to go on the
defensive. Evidence (see above) suggests that senior members of Congress and members of
powerful standing committees are able to steer significant amounts of pork to their districts. But
at the time Thompson defended his earmarks during the 110th Congress, he hardly possessed the
characteristics of an influential senior member of the House. By 2008, he had served nine years,
less than the average member tenure of 11 years and far less than that which would be
considered “senior.” He was not a party leader and did not serve on the powerful Appropriations
committee. Nor did he sit on the House Armed Services Committee or the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee. This anecdotal case suggests that Rep. Thompson may not have
used positions of power or authority to steer what was considered, by the press at the time, a
controversial set of defense earmarks valued at nearly $40 million. Perhaps his district just really
needed the projects.
It’s reasonable to assume that characteristics of the district should play a large part in
determining who gets what. Districts with a large share of hospitals might receive a larger share
of grants through the Department of Health and Human Services. Large cities with populations
dependent on federal housing assistance might receive a larger share of funds from the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. Congressional districts found across the U.S.
breadbasket could reasonably be expected to receive their fair share of Department of
Agriculture awards.
It is somewhat surprising then that so few empirical studies have tested the impact of
district demand on the distribution of federal funds. The ones that have, however, have
significantly contributed to our understanding of distributive policy based on rarely examined
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factors like constituent/district characteristics, geography, size, economic and demographic
profiles, and policy demand variables.
One of the earliest treatments of demand side determinants across a large number of
policy areas investigated the impact of both local characteristics and committee assignments
(Gryski 1991). In less than one-third (9 out of 32) of separate tests did jurisdictional
subcommittee membership positively influence the distribution of federal funds in those policy
areas. Jurisdictional committee leadership significantly predicted distribution in 34 percent of
cases (11 out of 32). Yet district-level characteristics were significant more than half the time (70
out of 128 coefficients). Lazarus (2009), building on Adler’s (2002) analyses of federal outlays,
examined the impact of local factors on earmarks across a similar number of policy areas and
found that 13 out of 17 earmarks categories related to at least one measure of local demand.
Particularly robust results were found for spending in the Departments of Agriculture, Interior,
and Commerce.
The influence of powerful committee members over federal spending has been
challenged by evidence that agencies and their bureaucrats function as “a legitimate fourth force
in government” (Strauss 1984, 640). An analysis of Commerce and HUD spending demonstrated
that agency heads were successful in minimizing political manipulation of programs by
regulating the timing of program announcements, in some cases against the wishes of powerful
committee members (Anagnoson 1982). Others have found evidence that bureaucratic influence
can deplete political effects, namely through the ability of agency heads to identify strong
applicants for federal grants (Gilbert and Specht 1974). More generally, federal assistance at the
application level before the actual distribution of funds has been found both to reduce overall
costs and to reduce levels of aid inequalities among districts (Stein 1981). These last two
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findings — thought different from measures of district demand — suggest that a significant level
of influence can take place at the administrative level before requests even reach the
authorizations or appropriations stages. Potoski and Talbert (2000) found that tax-exempt,
private, and non-governmental organizations had a more significant influence over the
distribution of discretionary grants than did committee members or agency heads.
Several studies are entirely devoted to investigating the impact of local characteristics on
one specific policy area — “partial studies” (Owens and Wade 1984, 404) — rather than across a
number of agencies. In contrast to some of the findings cited above that found that members of
the House Armed Services Committee or the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee received
significantly more benefits for their districts, others have demonstrated that local factors drive
this distribution. Employment levels and the actual capital expenditure requirements of the
military also have significant effects on federal awards (Goss 1973; Rundquist, Lee and Rhee
1996, Hird 1991). With respect to Homeland Security grants, past electoral returns predicted
some variation in awards, but more significant were local factors with stronger theoretical links
to the national defense, such as airport traffic and population density (Coats, Karahan and
Tollison 2006).
In an important study of the determinants of federal superfund expenditures, Hird (1990)
found that members of Congress had little influence over the distribution of cleanup funds.
Rather, a specific measure of public interest — Hazard Ranking System scores — was found to
be a more significant predictor of fund distribution than, for example, membership on the EPA’s
authorizing committee or appropriations subcommittee. Interest groups, in addition to the public
interest, have also been found to influence federal spending while controlling for the various
supply-side variables so prominent in the pork barrel literature (Lowry and Potoski 2004).
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IV. Theory and Evidence on the Economy, Wagner’s Law
The literature on determinants of pork barrel spending tends almost exclusively to focus
on political factors, and more recently, on measures of local demand. The role of economics is
rarely investigated. Two questions arise from time to time, but none receive serious treatment in
the literature. The first asks whether pork barrel projects are economically efficient. That is, do
they provide a benefit given the cost? Shepsle and Weingast (1981) argue that “because of the
political basis for calculating benefits and costs, ‘pork,’ in various forms, will always serve as
part of the legislator’s response to his voters’ retrospective question, ‘What have you done for
me lately?’ And, consequently, economic inefficiency will likely be a permanent characteristic of
the distributive policies of legislative institutions” (110). The “benefits and costs” to which the
authors refer are highly targeted benefits spread over widely distributed costs, which suggests
that members of Congress don’t care if a project is inefficient. Agencies too, don’t appear to
consider the true value of a project given their propensity to claim its effectiveness. Evans (2004,
4) notes “the readiness with which federal agencies claim that a project’s benefits equal or
exceed its costs highlights the practical difficulties of making judgments about project efficiency
in any case.”
A second question asks whether economic factors are thought to influence the
distribution of pork barrel projects specifically, and federal spending in general. Frisch (1998,
85-86) develops a general model of earmark spending in which he hypothesizes that distressed
districts will receive more earmarks than affluent ones. Specifically, he argues that “low income
districts would be more likely to receive earmarks than wealthier districts, as poor districts have
greater need for the economic development that can be associated with government spending.”
Others have found little evidence that distressed districts receive more earmarks (Boyle and
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Matheson 2009). Another view holds that increasing real incomes in U.S. Model Cities during
the 1960s led to more projects because higher tax revenues could be used to pay for more
services (Friedan and Kaplan 1987). Yet it appears true, as Lazarus (2009, 351) suggests, that
“no prior theoretical treatment points to [why economic factors can influence earmark
distribution].”
One way to address this theoretical gap would be through the application of Wagner’s
Law to distributive spending. The law, which reverses the Keynesian causal arrow (government
spending leads to increases in income), is based on the ideas of 19th-century German economist
Adolph Wagner and his so-called “law of increasing state activity” (Peacock and Scott 2000, 1).
He predicted that there existed a long-run relationship between growth in national income and
growth in government expenditures. He reasoned that as income went up, public sectors
experienced relative growth, which was associated with advances in technology, the growth of
political institutions, and increased political participation. Government needed to expand its
fiscal participation in response to these trends and expand its fiscal role due to the increasingly
complex and administrative functions it would have to assume (Bickers 1991). Moreover, greater
urbanization and population growth would require more public spending. Wagner also assumed
that the private sector would not be able to keep up with consistent and increasing levels of
growth, and so, the government would have to fill in the gaps (Mann 1981; Thornton 1999).
Wagner’s theory also assumes that the demand for public goods is income elastic, and
therefore, as income grows, so too does state expansion, which is typically modeled as
government expenditure (Burney and Al-Mussallam 1999). The simplest model of Wagner’s law
regresses some measure of government expenditure on some measure of income. Early
applications of the theory included population-based variables because Wagner also assumed
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that growth in population, as noted above, would also lead to growth in expenditure (Kyzrzaniak
2001). Since the time of Wagner, the “tendency for the public sector to grow relative to national
income has become widely accepted as a stylized fact in public finance” (Henrekson 1993, 1;
Islam 2001, 509).
One immediate complication that follows from Wagner’s theory is how to define the
dependent variable: government expenditure. Basic macroeconomic theory informs us that a
nation’s gross domestic product has five major components: consumption, investment,
government spending, exports, and imports. We are interested in the third component,
government spending, which itself is one of two components — along with taxes — that make
up a nation’s fiscal policy (Blanchard 2000, 42-46).
Wagner himself did not limit his definition of government spending to the national level.
In articulating his theory, he was careful to account for central government expenditure, local
government expenditure, and public enterprises (Peacock and Scott 2000). In a review of more
than a dozen studies on applications of Wagner’s Law, Peacock and Scott (2000, 2) show that
there is little consensus regarding how to operationalize expenditure. The authors note “there are
at least 14 different measures of [expenditure] ranging from very narrow definitions such as
those excluding transfers or excluding defense expenditure to wider definitions where all
expenditure found in the national accounts are included.” More bluntly, Mann (1981, 189) argues
“the empirical testing of [Wagner’s] hypothesis is difficult, for it is not certain exactly what is to
be tested.” Thus, Wagner’s theory leaves room for some interpretation of the dependent variable,
which in this paper is operationalized as new federal assistance awards.
Wagner was careful to include local government expenditure in his definition (Peacock
and Scott 2000). New federal awards distributed at the level of the Congressional district are a
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variant of funds provided “by the Congress for projects, programs, or grants” (OMB 2009)
within local districts or states. The history of distributive spending suggests that Wagner himself
might have been familiar with distributive spending. Were he to follow American economic
development during his lifetime, he would have known that “pork barrel and distributive policy
dates from the earliest days of the [American] republic … [when] policies consisted mainly of
projects of physical improvements such as lighthouses, roads, and canals, dams and harbors”
(Evans 2004, 4).
Since Wagner’s writings were translated from German to English in the 1950s, there have
been hundreds of studies testing the effects of income growth on government expenditure. Most
of them test the effects of income growth on government expenditure in developing countries,
but in recent years, many political economy scholars have applied principles of Wagner’s law to
the United States in general, and to specific states in particular.
The impact of income on expenditure has been found to be strong in the island nations of
the Caribbean as well as in Fiji. In a test of nine Caribbean nations, the effect was significant
(Legrenzi 2004). In a study of Fiji, Granger causality estimates validated the relationship as well,
but the authors caution that higher debt levels lead to decreased explanatory strength, since
increasing levels of national income are devoted to debt financing, rather than expenditure
programs (Narayan 2008). The Mexican economy appears to have followed Wagner’s Law
during more than 50 years of mid-century expansion (Mann, 1980), as it did for a large sample of
nations at similar levels of economic development. Despite this, the relationship was weak for
very poor and very wealthy nations, suggesting that the law might only apply to a specific level
of post-industrial development (Abizadeh and Gray 1985).
A review of the European countries has shown that the law has particularly strong
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explanatory power for many developed countries on the continent. The evidence is mixed for the
less developed nations like Greece and Portugal (Courakis, Moura-Roque and Tridimas 1993). In
a study of the law at the industry level in Greece, the law was found only to apply to the defense
industry (Chletsos and Collias 1997).
In historical and more contemporary tests of the United Kingdom, the law was found to
have strong explanatory power. One author found that “unidirectional causality ran from income
to public expenditure … [which provides] unambiguous support for Wagner’s Law … for Britain
during the period 1870-1913” (Oxley 1994, 295). Gyles (1991; also see Chang 2002; Chang Lui
and Caudill 2004) demonstrated that in the UK, Wagner’s Law is highly significant as an inputoutput mechanism. A study of six nations in 19th century Europe showed that “Granger-causality
was mainly unidirectional from income to government expenditure. Thus, there is considerable
support for Wagner’s Law” (Thornton 1999, 416). Finally, Wahab (2004) observed the presence
of Wagner’s Law in the OECD countries was strong in periods of accelerating national income
(also see Kolluri 2000).
Until this point, it may appear to be pure conjecture to apply the principles of Wagner’s
Law to any study of the United States. Yet, a few scholars have demonstrated its validity at the
national and state levels. In a comparative study of four Asian nations, plus the UK and U.S.,
strong support was found for the validity of Wagner’s law in five of those nations studied, with
the exception of Thailand (Chang 2002; Chang Lui and Caudill 2004). The United States has
also been studied in a non-comparative model, and strong support for Wagner’s Law was found.
(Islam 2001). In justifying the application of the law at the state level, Abizadeh and Yousefi
(1988) argue that since Wagner himself assumed that his “law” applied to peaceful nations with
generally homogeneous cultural and institutional characteristics, then the theory could be applied
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to the American states. Indeed, they find that increases in income do lead to even larger increases
in public expenditure in a study of a dozen states.

Unemployment
While Wagner’s Law provides theoretical justification for the inclusion of income in a
model of distributive politics, macroeconomic theory provides some justification for also
including unemployment. Assume that an increase in unemployment could lead to members of
Congress increasing their requests for projects in order to shore up the lot of the jobless in their
districts. The economic logic is that rising unemployment places downward pressure on wages
since unemployed workers have less bargaining power than employed workers. This relationship
is captured in the nominal wage determination,
W = PeF(u, z)
where W = wages; Pe = expected prices; u = unemployment, inversely related to wages; and z =
all other variables, positively related to wages (Blanchard 2000, 114). As wages decline in
environments of high unemployment, when consumers have less disposable income, firms face
reductions in output. Lower output levels and the costs associated with holding excess inventory
causes downward pressure on prices, and in the end, profits. This description, in large part,
echoes the economic environment occurring during the U.S. recession that took hold in 2008.
Given these conditions, one might conclude that members of Congress would be tempted to dole
out earmarks to those businesses and organizations suffering during the economic slump. In this
case, then, rising unemployment might lead to district level increases in federal funding. Such
logic would be consistent with the fiscal stimulus hypothesis, in which weak economic
conditions could help explain pork barrel spending (Frisch 1998; Martin 2003).
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V. Hypotheses
This paper has three main hypotheses of interest. The first is drawn from the premise that
characteristics of the district should be considered alongside intra-chamber political factors in
determining who gets a certain class of federal awards and how much. For example, a district
with more farm acreage and rural land is expected to receive more new awards and a greater
share of Department of Agriculture funding than a district that is, for example, primarily urban.
Similarly, a district with a greater than average percentage of blue collar workers or members of
a union would be expected to receive more awards in both count and value from the Department
of Labor. Table 4 (below) contains the predicted direction for each of the district-level variables
and the actual results.
The second hypothesis centers on income effects. The income effects predicted by
Wagner’s Law are frequently tested in the economics literature. Based on the theoretical analysis
outlined above, districts with higher median income levels are expected to receive a larger share
of government spending. Higher median incomes lead to growth in the public sector and
associated advances in technology. At some juncture, it is the role of government to increase its
participation in this relative growth by expanding its administrative functions as indicated by a
rise in federal spending. Thus, districts with larger per capita income would receive both a
greater number of new awards in addition to more aggregate funding.
The third variable of interest in unemployment. As unemployment rises, corporate output
declines and districts are expected to receive more projects in order to make up for lost
production. Frisch (1998) too argues that high levels of unemployment can lead to increases in
pork barrel spending. Thus, I expect to see the number and value of projects rise as a response to
rising levels of unemployment.
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My primary controls are the political variables that research has shown significantly
impact the distribution of various types of federal funds. Prior vote share has been shown to
influence spending in a variety of ways, from award type (Lazarus and Reilly 2009), to shares
accruing to vulnerable members (Martin 2003; Stein and Bickers 1994; Lazarus 2008), to
benefits for political parties (Levitt and Snyder 1995; Keefer and Khemani 2009). Members of
the Democratic Party and more liberal members of Congress are expected to deliver more federal
money to their districts than are Republicans or conservatives. Members of the majority party
have been shown to use their majority party status to overcome collective action issues in order
to direct benefits to their districts (Cox and McCubbins 1991 and 1995; Levitt and Snyder 1995;
Bickers and Stein 2000). Members who hold powerful leadership posts, such as those on relevant
authorizing and appropriating subcommittees, are expected to receive more funding for their
districts (Carsey and Rundquist 1999, Rundquist and Carsey 2002, Adler 2002; Arnold 1979). I
add a number of additional committee positions as controls, such as membership on Rules,
Budget, Ways and Means, and Appropriations. More senior members of Congress and members
of the prestigious “Cardinals” coterie should also be able to deliver more pork to their districts
than non-members. An exception to this hypothesis is that some powerful Cardinals may be able
to force members to relinquish awards (Savage 1991). Finally, districts with larger land area
should receive more awards because new assistance projects, like earmarks, are well suited for
large geographic areas (Frisch 1998; Gryzki 1991; Lazarus 2009).

VI. Data, Variables and Empirical Model
The focus of this study is to measure the effects of variation in demand side variables and
select economic factors on the distribution of new federal grants and awards. The dependent
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variable is operationalized twice: once as a district-level count of new federal awards, and again
as a district-level aggregate dollar value of new awards. The unit of analysis is the U.S House
district and the sample size is 435 for the total number of districts. This analysis proceeds in two
parts. First, I estimate a single model in which I test the impact of political and economic factors
on distributive spending within a single model. Next, I separate the data into 23 separate federal
agencies and bureaucratic divisions and for each category test the impact of characteristics of
local demand, in addition to the political and economic variables tested in the single model.
Data on these awards are drawn from the Federal Assistance Award Data System
(FAADS). The system represented a sea change in financial accountability, as reporting of such
awards up until 1981 was conducted with paper and film and were often hard to track down.
Weissert (1981, 76) summarized the new data collection effort at the time: “The FAADS system
is an outgrowth of an aid information study under the Federal Program Information Act which
requires the executive branch to improve distribution of federal assistance information … the
Office of Management and Budget provides policy oversight and guidance for the development
and implementation of FAADS” (See Bickers and Stein 1991 for a comprehensive review of the
history of federal record keeping).
For the 2008 fiscal year, these data covered more than 600 separate programs across
thirty-three departments and agencies. The entire FAADS database includes itemizations for 1.5
million awards valued at $3 trillion dollars. Awards can be for single Congressional districts or
spread across multiple districts. More than half of awards and 40 percent of the total value of
awards went to single districts. The data can be aggregated a number of ways, but perhaps the
most important breakdown, besides by Congressional district or agency, is by the type of award.
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FAADS award type is classified in one of four ways: (1) as a new assistance action; (2)
as a continuation from a previous award; (3) as a revision, representing a change in funding; or
(4) as a funding adjustment to an already completed project. In the 2008 fiscal year, there were
531,000 new awards – about one-third of the total awards – valued at $262 billion. Table 1
provides a summary of new award counts and values across the 23 agencies and divisions
studied in this paper. The table also includes jurisdictional authorizing committees and
appropriations subcommittees for each agency.

Table 1
Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables
Dependent Variables
FAADS counts
FAADS dollars
Independent Variables
Prior Vote — Democrat
Prior Vote — Republican
Democrat
NOMINATE
District Ideology
Party Leader
Appropriations
Ways & Means
Budget
Rules
Committee Chair
Majority Party Cardinal
Minority Party Cardinal
Seniority
Income
Unemployment
Land Area

Mean
1,222
$600,000,000

Min
149
$57,578,270

Max
6240
$9,445,000,000

SD
893
$660,000,000

.397
.294

0
0

1
1

.387
.323226

—

0

1

—

.016062
49.3057

-.73
21
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
$19,311
1.24
12

.999
90
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
52
$80,397
6.76
663,267

.438557
14.2579

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
11.1
$43,437
2.81
8,335

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
8.4
$10,939
.86
34,411

Bickers and Stein (1994; also see Lowi 1964) argue that scholars should use new, not
existing, awards in studies of distributive politics. A new award “is an indicator of the flow of
resource commitments by the federal government” (Bickers and Stein 2004, 810). There is some
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debate over the merits of using dollar values in addition to counts. Bickers and Stein (1994, 394)
argue that in the mind of an election-seeking member of Congress, the ability to deliver many
new awards of lesser value is more important than a small number of large awards. That it is “the
occurrence of an award not its dollar size that is usually salient to constituents” is challenged by
Alvarez and Saving (1997, 815). They argue that voters “would prefer a program in their district
with a large dollar amount to a program with a small dollar amount.” I thus employ a dependent
variable that measures the total value of new district level awards, in addition to the number of
awards (see also Adler 2002 for the use of dollars as a dependent variable).
As noted above, not all federal awards go to single districts. Of the 435 Congressional
districts, 273 received single-district awards, while in 162 districts, awards were distributed in an
unspecified manner. This method of distribution leaves open the possibility of error in each of
the two dependent variables. Bickers and Stein (1991) address this error by distributing such
awards (coded “90” by FAADS) according to county-level population data. That approach, while
useful, requires data collection and assimilation resources that are beyond the scope of this paper.
To address this issue, I evenly distributed multiple-district awards across each district within a
state. An alternative to this approach would be to run each test with a sample size equal to 273.
While such an approach might generate conclusions about federal funding within a segment of
Congress, it makes it hard to draw conclusions about the entire institution.
Independent variables of interest are drawn from Lazurus’s (2009) dataset used in his
study of the effects of district level demand on earmark distribution during the 2008 fiscal year
of the 110th Congress (see also Adler 2002). That study investigated effects across 16 different
federal agencies. This study includes most of those agencies, in addition to a few more for a total
of 23 separate tests. For the most part, I was able to use the same existing data and test its effects
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against distributions that theoretically might be impacted by similar levels of local demand. For
example, my study includes a number of military departments – Navy, Army, Air Force – that
were not included in Lazarus. So for example, levels of local demand used in the estimate of
Army awards are also used for the three other departments of the military. On at least a few
occasions, I developed new independent variables for authorizing committees and appropriations
subcommittees that were not included in Lazarus’ study of earmarks. An example of this is the
authorizing committee for the Department of Homeland Security.
I add variables for median income to test the effects of Wagner’s Law and employment to
test whether district-level joblessness results in members of Congress creating new programs in
an effort to generate jobs. Both economic variables are drawn from the annual American
Community Survey, which collects national data for the Census on non-decennial years.
Control variables include measures of electoral vulnerability, ideology, seniority,
committee membership, party, and leadership. Existing theories of pork barrel politics and
logrolling predict that increases in or the presence of these measures results in home districts
receiving a larger number of awards or more awards. The first aggregate model of counts and
dollars will include political and economic predictors to account for demand for government
spending, broadly construed.

Aggregate model (Table 3):
New Awards = f (Democratic vote share, Republican vote share, party, district ideology,
party leader, authorizing committee, appropriations subcommittee, Appropriations, Ways &
Means, Budget, Rules, committee chair, major Cardinal, minor Cardinal, seniority, income,
unemployment, land area)
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Demand-side variables added to aggregate model (demand-side results reported in Table 4):
New Awards = f (variables from aggregate model + 1st demand-side variable, 2nd
demand-side variable (if applicable) and 3rd demand-side variable (if applicable))

All estimations of the number of new awards are performed using negative binomial
regression with robust standard errors. Histograms of the dependent variable reveal
overdispersion parameters greater than zero, rendering NBR the appropriate estimation method
for counts (Lowry and Potoski 2004; Lazarus 2009). All estimations of the value of new awards
are performed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with a logged dependent variable
(Achen 2000, Martin 2003, Lowry and Potoski 2004; Lazarus 2009).

VII. Empirical Results
Summary statistics for dependent and independent variables are found in Table 1, above.
In Table 2, each federal agency or bureaucratic division is followed by summary data about new
FAADS awards in addition to the relevant jurisdictional committees that are included in unique
estimations across the separate agencies. Three agencies — HUD, Agriculture, and HHS —
received more than 100,000 new federal assistance awards for FY 2008. These three agencies,
along with Transportation and Education, received awards totaling more than $10 billion. The
Department of Education was the only agency with an average award exceeding $2 million. Four
other agencies — Labor, Transportation, Commerce and the Army — received awards averaging
more than $1 million each.
The regression in Table 3 presents results (with robust standard errors in parentheses) of
the aggregate test of intra-chamber and economic variables. Columns 2 and 4 include all
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Table 2
Agencies, Awards, and Committee Jurisdiction, FY 2008
Number of
New Awards
141,166
138,744

FAADS
Value of New
Awards ($)
38,827,114,698
71,565,552,427

Avg. Award
Value ($)
275,046
515,810

137,445

58,406,268,709

424,943

32,383
12,746

47,660,078,178
2,394,351,783

1,471,762
187,851

Education

8,363

18,701,424,829

2,236,210

Interior

7,879

2,185,686,147

277,407

DHS

5,502

4,325,792,927

786,222

Justice

5,345

2,641,631,625

494,225

Arts-related

3,574

1,187,921,256

332,379

EPA

2,074

2,044,592,386

985,821

Commerce

1,832

2,278,391,056

1,243,663

Labor

1,599

2,875,276,439

1,798,172

Energy

1,141

1,036,870,069

908,738

Army
Navy
Air Force
NASA
Defense

1,035
989
980
766
598

1,123,037,493
287,266,935
143,247,037
57,873,665
97,554,399

1,085,060
290,462
146,170
75,553
163,134

501

142,341,625

284,115

220
168
121
26,274
531,418

179,125,127
8,504,393
43,754,510
3,952,839,119
262,166,496,832

814,205
50,621
361,608
150,447
493,334

Agency /
Division /
Department
HUD
Agriculture
HHS
Transportation
NSF

National Service
Small Business
Treasury
Army Corps
Not tested
Totals:

Jurisdictional Committees
Authorizing
Appropriations
Committee
Subcommittee
Finance
Transportation
Agriculture
Agriculture
Energy &
Labor
Commerce
Transportation
Transportation
Science
CJS
Education &
Labor
Labor
Natural
Interior
Resources
Homeland
Homeland Security
Security
Judiciary
CJS
Education &
Labor
Labor
Science
CJS
Energy &
CJS
Commerce
Education &
Labor
Labor
Energy &
Energy
Commerce
Armed Forces
Defense
Armed Forces
Defense
Armed Forces
Defense
Science
CJS
Armed Forces
Defense
Education &
Labor
Labor
Finance
Finance
Finance
Finance
Transportation
Transportation

—
—

—
—

coefficients for counts and dollars, respectively. Neither is directly interpretable because
negative binomial regression was used to estimate counts, and the dependent variable for dollars
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is logged. Substantive effects are estimated through the use of Clarify software (Tomz, et al.
2001) and are represented in Figures 1-11.
The results for the effects of changes in income suggest that Wagner’s Law of
“increasing state activity” is supported for the distribution of dollars but not of counts. This is the
expected result, since past empirical tests almost universally test the predictive power of
Wagner’s law on the expenditure of dollars, not the growth in projects. For dollars, districts with
higher incomes receive more total dollars, as increasing income one standard deviation above the
mean results in $81 million more in new federal assistance. For counts, an increase in one
standard deviation above mean district income results in a decline of about 34 new awards per
district, all else equal. The relationship is monotonic but possibly non-linear, as adding a
quadratic control for income results in a null relationship between income and counts. Adding a
quadratic control for income to this estimation reveals that Wagner’s Law may have some
explanatory power — to a point. Because the coefficient for the quadratic is negative instead of
positive, there exists the possibility that beyond a certain point, it is no longer politically
expedient to fund increasingly wealthy districts, despite the developmental need.
The estimation of counts reveals that districts with higher levels of unemployment also
receive fewer new assistance awards — 22 fewer, all else equal. This result runs contrary to the
fiscal stimulus hypothesis that districts in need of jobs-generating stimulus will receive more
awards. On the other hand, the estimation of dollars does support the fiscal stimulus hypothesis.
In this case, an increase of one standard deviation from the mean results in $58 million more in
new federal assistance for the district. The finding suggests that dollars may be a more important
indicator of economic stimulus than project counts. Taken together, districts with higher incomes
and higher unemployment receive fewer awards, but more dollars.
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Table 3
Negative Binomial Regression Results for New FAADS Award Counts and
OLS Regression Results for New FAADS Award Dollars, FY 2008
Independent Variable
Prior Vote — Democrat
Prior Vote — Republican
Democrat
NOMINATE
District Ideology
Party Leader
Appropriations
Ways & Means
Budget
Rules
Committee Chair
Majority Party Cardinal
Minority Party Cardinal
Seniority
Income
Unemployment
Land Area
Constant
N
Pseudo R2
R2
Log Pseudolikelihood
Wald χ2

Number of awards
.774*
(.276)
.034
(.339)
-.759*
(.324)
-.665*
(.220)
-.003
(.004)
-.122
(.120)
-.022
(.077)
-.024
(.087)
-.108
(.083)
-.118
(.129)
.015
(.120)
.271
(.258)
-.004
(.128)
-.003
(.004)
-9.36e-06*
(3.27e-06)
-.147*
(.041)
.212*
(.024)
6.559*
(.615)
435
.04
—
-3,299
450

Dollar Value of Awards
.924*
(.329)
.075
(.563)
-.469
(.429)
-.207
(.215)
-.011
(.004)
-.020
(.124)
-.002
(.075)
-.043
(.105)
-.171
(.103)
.082
(.090)
-.163
(.156)
-.035
(.206)
-.106
(.199)
-.001
(.004)
.00001*
(2.94e-06)
.102*
(.039)
.066*
(.020)
19.140*
(.569)
435
—
.09
—
—
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The results reveal that a number of political factors heavily influence the distribution of
counts and to a lesser extent, dollars. Democrats with higher vote share during the previous
election were able to acquire more benefits for their districts — both in terms of counts and
dollars. A one standard deviation increase in prior vote share for Democrats translated into 550
extra awards and $180 million. No such effects were found for Republican prior vote share. This
result is contrary to a body of evidence suggesting that vulnerable members tend to acquire
greater benefits for the districts (Stein and Bickers 1994 and 1996; Levitt and Snyder 1997;
Lazarus 2009; Lazarus and Reilly 2010). On the other hand, it may be true that during the 110th
Congress, districts that delivered strong results for Democrats were rewarded with new federal
assistance. Voters did, in fact, give Democrats a majority in both the House and the Senate (by
caucusing with Independents) for the first time since the end of the 103rd Congress in 1995.
As predicted, liberal members (those with increasingly negative NOMINATE scores)
received more awards than more conservative members. A one standard deviation decrease from
the chamber’s mean NOMINATE score is associated with an increase in new awards by 392.
Members of the Democratic Party appear to receive fewer awards — 453 as the code moves
from 0 for Republicans to 1 for Democrats. Districts in which John Kerry received a higher vote
share in 2004 received $48 million less in new federal assistance, all else equal.
The most surprising finding is the absence of significant committee membership effects
in the controls for all standing and jurisdictional committee posts. Neither party leaders, nor
powerful committee members, nor chairmen, nor Cardinals, nor senior members of Congress can
be shown, by virtue of their jurisdictional standing, significantly to impact the distribution of
new federal awards for their district. These results, as later tests show, are consistent across

29
Figures 1-6

Substantive Effects of Significant Independent Variables on FAADS Counts
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Figures 7-11
Substantive Effects of Significant Independent Variables on FAADS Dollars ($000,000)
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virtually all agencies with the exception of a few cases. The results are somewhat at odds with
the standard pork barrel thesis that powerful politicians take advantage of their assignments in
order to steer funds to their districts and supports the emerging view that other factors matter
(Owens and Wade 1984).
A final variable demonstrates highly consistent significant effects for land area. In the
case of both counts and dollars, larger districts get more. A one standard deviation increase in
logged land area corresponds with 380 more new awards in terms of counts and $89 million in
terms of dollars. Frisch (1998) argues that earmarks — a separate though related form of
distributive spending — “involve projects suited to large geographic areas.” Land area was
logged to minimize the possibility of skew effects from large states, and separate tests removing
the congressional district from Alaska (largest state; 18 percent of total U.S. territory) do not
impact levels of significance in the original aggregate estimations of counts or dollars. The
significant findings with respect to land area are consistent with several empirical tests of
earmark distribution in the House (Frisch 1998; Gryzki 1991; Lazarus 2009).

Effects across Federal Agencies and Bureaucratic Divisions
Table 4 presents the results of 23 separate tests of district level demand across nearly all
agencies and divisions present in the FY 2008 FAADS database. Counts and dollars across
districts are regressed on the same variables found in Table 3 with the addition of one to three
demand-side variables for each agency. Each agency, its associated demand-side variables and
expected coefficient direction are listed in columns 1-3. The first expected direction refers to the
hypothesis that counts will increase along with larger values of demand-side variables, while the
second expected direction refers to the expected changes in dollars. All hypothesized directions
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are positive. Substantive effects for select hypothesized relationships are included in Table 5,
below.
The last column presents the results of 23 separate estimations including all relevant
variables. As noted above, independent variables are drawn from Adler (2002) and Lazarus
(2009). The entire model reveals significant relationships in more than one-third of total cases —
21 out of 56 for both counts and dollars. That is, the model of both counts and dollars included
56 demand-side variables across the 23 agencies and in 21 cases, the effect was positive and
significant. Both significant and non-significant signs are reported in Table 4, with significant
outcomes denoted with an asterisk. The most robust results in which at least half of hypothesized
indicators are significant and positive occurred for HUD, HHS, NSF, Interior, the
arts, Labor, Energy, and Treasury. Results were positive and significant for both counts and
dollars for 12 separate demand-level indicators. In a number of cases, the same indicators that
correlate with the distribution of the number of earmarks (Lazarus 2009) also correlate with the
distribution of the number of new federal assistance awards. They are HUD (population density),
Agriculture (rural population), Energy (has research university), Interior (parks area), and
Commerce (has research university and borders ocean).
As was the case with aggregate model, increases in income are strongly correlated with
the distribution of new dollars, consistent with the predictions of Wagner’s Law. In 17 out of 23
agencies, income is positively correlated with new award dollars. Income and counts are
positively correlated in 7 of 23 agencies. The most robust results, in which both dollars and
counts are greater in districts with higher incomes occur for HHS, NSF, Education, the arts,
Commerce, Energy, and the Navy.
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Table 4
Agencies and Associated Characteristics of District Demand
Predicted and Actual Results
Agency / Department
Housing and Urban
Development,
Department of
Agriculture, Department
of
Health and Human
Services, Department of
Transportation,
Department of
National Science
Foundation
Education, Department
of

Interior, Department of
the

Justice, Department of

Homeland Security,
Department of
Library Sciences, Arts,
Humanities, etc.
Environmental
Protection Agency
Commerce, Department
of
Labor, Department of
Energy, Department of

District Demand Indicator Description
Population density
% of residents living in urban areas
Dummy: district is in one of 50 biggest cities
% of residents employed in farming, fishing
and wildlife
% of residents living in rural areas
% of population employed in health care
# of hospitals in district
% of population employed in transportation
and public utilities
% of population employed in construction
% of population who are students
Dummy: district has a research university
% of population who are scientists
% of population who are students
Dummy: district has a research university
Number of major universities
Population density
# of national parks (by state)
acreage managed by Bureau of Land
Management (by state)
population density
% of residents living in urban areas
dummy: district is in one of 50 biggest cities
population density
% of residents living in urban areas
dummy: district is in one of 50 biggest cities
dummy: district has a research university
population density
% of residents who are students
dummy: district is in one of 50 biggest cities
population density
dummy: district has a research university
dummy: district boarders an ocean
% of population employed in blue collar
professions
% of population belonging to a union
dummy: district has a research university

Predicted
Result1
+/+
+/+
+/+

Actual
Result2
+* / +*
-* / +*
-* / -*

+/+

+/+

+/+
+/+
+/+

+* / +
+* / +*
-/+

+/+

+/+

+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+

-/+* / +*
+* / +*
+/+
+* / +
+/+
+/+
+* / +
-* / +

+/+

+* / +*

+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+

+* / +
+ / +*
-* / +
+/+
+* / +
-* / +
+* / +*
+* / +*
+/+
+ / +*
+ / +*
+* / +*
+* / +*

+/+

+* / +*

+/+
+/+

-* / -*
+* / +*
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Table 4
Agencies and Associated Characteristics of District Demand
Predicted and Actual Results
Agency / Department

Army, Department of the

Navy, Department of the

Air Force, Department of
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Defense, Department of

Corporation for National
and Community Service
Small Business
Administration
Treasury, Department of
the
U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers

District Demand Indicator Description
# of military installations in district
# of major military installations in district
% of population in the military (noncivilian)
workforce
# of military installations in district
# of major military installations in district
% of population in the military (noncivilian)
workforce
# of military installations in district
# of major military installations in district
% of population in the military (noncivilian)
workforce
dummy: district contains a NASA
installation
# of military installations in district
# of major military installations in district
% of population in the military (noncivilian)
workforce
population density
% of residents living in urban areas
dummy: district is in one of 50 biggest cities
size of the state's banking assets
% of population employed in finance,
insurance, and real estate
size of the state's banking assets
% of population employed in finance,
insurance, and real estate
dollars of damage caused by floods (10-year
average, by state)
dollars of flood damage prevented (10-year
average, by state)

Predicted
Result1
+/+
+/+

Actual
Result2
+ / +*
+* / +

+/+

+/+

+/+
+/+

+/+
+/+

+/+

+ / +*

+/+
+/+

+/+
+/-

+/+

+/+

+/+

+* / +

+/+
+/+

+/+
+ +

+/+

+/+

+/+
+/+
+/+
+/+

+/+
-/+
+ / +*
+/+

+/+

+ / +*

+/+

+* / +

+/+

+* / +*

+/+

+ / +*

+/+

+/+

Notes:
1
Predicted results indicate counts first and dollars second.
2
Actual results indicate counts first and dollars second. All coefficient directions are noted. Only significant
directions are represented with asterisk.
* — Significant at p < .05.

Higher unemployment levels are significantly correlated with more dollars in 10
agencies, lending support to the fiscal stimulus hypothesis. We know from the aggregate model
that districts with higher unemployment receive a smaller number of awards and this is also true
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for counts for six agencies — the National Science Foundation, Labor, the Army, NASA, the
Department of Defense, and the Corporation for National and Community Service.
Political variables that significantly predicted the distribution of counts and dollars are
significant across several agencies. In three categories of agency awards — HUD, HHS, and the
Army — higher incumbent vote percentages for Democrats result in greater award counts and
dollars. This is true across seven agencies for counts and 11 agencies for dollars. Another
consistently significant variable is member ideology, where more liberal members secure more
benefits. Consistent with the aggregate model, this is much more frequently the case for counts
than for dollars. Also consistent with the aggregate model is that Democrats are likely to receive
fewer awards than Republicans, likely because of the colinearity between the party and ideology
variables.
Membership on standing committees, seniority, and leadership roles are rarely significant
across the 23 agencies tested, consistent with the aggregate model, but contrary to a great deal of
existing empirical evidence. A surprising result is that membership on the powerful
Appropriations committee is significant in only two out of 46 tests (23 tests each for counts and
dollars), and in both cases the coefficient is in the wrong hypothesized direction. This is similar
with membership on Ways and Means and on Budget. Also contrary to a great deal of empirical
evidence is the incredibly weak predictive power of membership on Authorizing committees and
Appropriations subcommittees. Members of these committees are thought to influence program
creation and funding levels significantly, but only in a handful of cases does this appear to be the
case. Only membership on the authorizing committee for Agriculture appears to impact the
distribution of new agriculture awards. Membership on Appropriations subcommittees appears to
matter only in the cases of arts programs, NASA, community service, and the Army Corps of
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Engineers. These programs receive neither a large number of awards nor a large aggregate value
of awards.
As expected, larger districts receive more awards and more dollars. The scope of this
result is impressive, occurring in 19 agencies for counts and 12 agencies for dollars.

VIII. Discussion
The gains-from-exchange model of distributive theory argues that members of standing
congressional committees are able to secure a disproportionate share of federal funds for their
districts. Yet the results of the present study offer evidence to the contrary. In aggregate tests of
the distribution of new federal assistance and in dozens of demand-side estimations across
federal agencies and bureaucratic divisions, this hypothesis finds little to no support. Instead,
measures of district demand, variations in economic indicators, and select political factors like
vote share, party, and ideology have far more predictive power than membership on
jurisdictional congressional committees.
The findings in this study provide evidence that new federal assistance awards are not
distributed based solely on political and intra-chamber factors, but on economic and geographic
ones as well. The article’s test of Wagner’s Law of “increasing state activity” demonstrates that
districts with higher incomes receive more aggregate funding, but fewer total awards. Such
districts, then, receive larger awards on average. This could be due to the fact that districts with
greater tax revenue also demand larger federal projects, though not necessarily more. A future
analysis could include a more highly specified test of Wagner’s Law, in which the distribution of
federal assistance is tested against various levels of income growth over time across a number of
Congresses.
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As a study of the distribution of new federal assistance awards during the 110th Congress
in FY 2008, the findings herein are merely a snapshot of distributive effects. Federal assistance
in the form of earmarks (Law and Tonon 2006; Boyle and Matheson 2009; Lazarus 2009 and
2010) and contingent liabilities (Bickers and Stein 1996 and 2004; Lazarus and Reilly 2010) has
also been tested and such tests should be applied to more recent Congresses. Moreover, Adler
(2002) demonstrated that committee effects can vary widely across different agencies during
multiple Congresses.
The present study could be improved by adding federal awards for FY 2009 in order to
capture the entire 110th Congress, in addition to including the prior, Republican-controlled
House in order to search for more robust majority party effects. Future studies of pork
distribution should also include a closer inspection of effects in the Senate (Lauderdale 2008 and
Lazarus 2009).
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